With the rising availability of smart devices (e.g., smart thermostats, lights, locks, etc.), they are increasingly combined into "smart homes". A key component of smart homes are event sensors that report physical events (such as doors opening or the light turning on) which can be triggered automatically by the system or manually by the user. However, data from these sensors are not always trustworthy. Both faults in the event sensors and involvement of active attackers can lead to reporting of events that did not physically happen (event spoong). This is particularly critical, as smart homes can trigger event chains (e.g., turning the radiator owhen a window is opened) without involvement of the user.
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of commercial smart home devices, the Internetof-Things (IoT) paradigm is no longer a dream of the future. From smart locks over smart surveillance cameras to remote-controlled garage doors, IoT devices are starting to permeate consumer homes, enriching them with a wide variety of functions and information that is only a button press away.
Unfortunately, this new and fast-evolving market has pushed manufacturers towards quick development cycles that favor features and a fast time to market over security issues. This has led to an ecosystem where vulnerable devices are far-spread and often remain unpatched [18] .
Several approaches have been proposed to reduce the risk posed by insecure IoT devices. Most of these approaches focus on either device and smart application permission systems [12, 17, 25] or network trac analysis [2, 21, 30] . But none of these approaches can protect event integrity after a device has been compromised. A compromised device can control what data it sends to the smart home system and thus lie about what it is really doing or sensing. Possible attacks range from smart cameras being turned on without the knowledge of the occupants to smart locks not locking the door as instructed. An interesting property of smart home systems is the interconnectedness of events. A device that seems to have no security relevance can become an attack vector if it triggers actions by other devices (e.g., a system that unlocks the back door when the kitchen light is being turned on [7] ). An overview of smart home devices and potential attacker goals can be found in Table 1 .
While the presence of cheap and possibly insecure devices in their homes puts consumers at risk, the pervasiveness of sensors also provides new ways to strengthen the security of these systems. As sensors can measure the physical eects of device actions and events, they can thus be used as a secondary source to verify that these events have actually occurred. As an example, Figure 1 shows how a closing door aects a pressure sensor, a light sensor and an accelerometer placed within the same room. Table 1 provides a (non-exhaustive) overview of which sensors are expected to sense eects of events relating to current smart home devices.
In this work, we introduce P, a system that automatically veries events in smart homes based on their physical signatures. As events are fed into the system, it uses the distributed sensor data for supervised learning of the corresponding event signatures. By leveraging sensors available in the same physical environment, P can verify if reported events have actually occurred. Our system is able to automatically learn these signatures and the sensors that are relevant for verication without supervision by the user. We show the feasibility of P in a real-world experiment.
Contributions.
• We introduce P, a system to automatically learn smart home event signatures for various sensing modalities. • We evaluate P in a real-world experiment with 48 sensors and 22 dierent event types over two weeks. We make this dataset publicly available 1 . • We introduce a method for the attacker to predict spoong opportunities to increase their success rate and show that P is still eective against this strong adversary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of smart home background and related work. Sections 3 and 4 outline our system and threat model. We describe our experimental design in Section 5 and our methods in Section 6. We present our results in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
BACKGROUND 2.1 Smart home systems
Smart home systems enable users to remotely control and monitor devices and automate everyday tasks. These devices range from surveillance cameras over smart locks to self-learning thermostats. Due to these devices, users are now able to remotely view their homes, automatically unlock the front door when arriving at home, and ooad the burden of worrying about energy-ecient heating.
There are many competing smart home systems ranging from commercial solutions such as Samsung's SmartThings [16] and Apple's HomeKit [15] to open-source tools like OpenHAB [24] and HomeAssistant [3] .
Even though these systems use dierent terminology, they all have the same fundamental conceptual design. Each system uses a smart hub as a central node that aggregates data and controls the interactions between devices. Additionally, the hub often connects devices to external cloud services. Devices can have sensors measuring their physical environment, as well as actuators that interact with it. For example, the opening and closing of a door can be detected by a magnetic contact switch (sensor) mounted on the doorframe, whereas a smart light switch (actuator) can be used to remotely control a ceiling light.
These devices have internal states that are representations of the actual physical states they are monitoring. In the previous example, the door can be either "open" or "closed", while the ceiling light has the states "on" or "o". Physical events are state changes that can be triggered by the user directly (e.g., opening a door), through a user interface (e.g., "Alexa, turn on the kitchen light"), or automatically by the system hub (e.g., lower blinds at sunset every day). When a smart device notices that a monitored physical state changes, the device noties the hub by sending an event notication. Note the dierence between physical events and event notications. Physical events are the phenomena happening in the real world, whereas event notications represent the view that a smart device has (or claims to have) of those phenomena.
Automations of devices are congured by the user through rules that typically follow the trigger-action principle. For example, a rule can state that whenever the kitchen door opens (trigger), the ceiling light in the kitchen should be turned on (action). In many systems, several actions can be grouped together by creating modes to simplify rules. If the user wants to open the blinds and make a cup of coee every time their alarm goes o, they can create a "good-morning" mode that triggers all these actions at a certain time rather than program them all individually.
Related work
Security of smart home systems. There has been extensive research focusing on the security of smart home systems and devices. Fernandes et al. [11] investigated the popular SmartThings system and uncovered several vulnerabilities due to overprivileged smart home applications. One of these vulnerabilities allows malicious applications running on the smart hub to spoof events as if they were originating from other devices in the network, thus triggering unintended actions such as erroneously setting o a re alarm. This risk extends even beyond malicious control software as presented in their paper, as compromised devices can easily send false event updates, or suppress the notication of an actual event.
As demonstrated by Sivaraman et al. [31] , malicious mobile phone applications can compromise home networks and thus open up smart home systems to attacks from remote attackers over the internet. Ronen et al. [27] showed how physical proximity can be used to compromise smart devices. They exploited communication protocol aws present in Philips Hue smart lamps to create a worm that can spread across a city from household to household. In [26] , Ronen and Shamir further showed how attackers can misuse compromised smart devices such as smart lights and go beyond their intended functionality.
Security of trigger-action programming. Previous work has highlighted the risks posed by unsafe and insecure interactions between devices and smart applications. Device actuations can lead to unintentional consequences if trigger-action rules are being used in dierent contexts [17] , if they include external triggeraction platforms [7] , or if they include hidden inter-app interactions [10] . These issues have been addressed through more ne-grained permission systems [17, 32] , better logging for forensic purposes [33] , and static analysis of smart applications [6, 7, 10, 23] to detect possible physical channel interactions. While these systems help to reduce the risk that these interactions pose, they do not protect against cases where an existing and desired trigger-action rule is being exploited, e.g., by a compromised smart home device.
Device and behaviorngerprinting. There has been an increased interest in identifying smart home devices and ngerprinting of device behavior. Several solutions have been proposed that identify devices based on their network trac ngerprint [4, 21, 30] . Other work has focused on inferring smart home activities and device event signatures from network trac to highlight the privacy implications of wireless communication in smart homes [1, 2] . Closest to our work is HoMonit [34] , which uses network trac based event ngerprints to detect event spoong from misbehaving smart applications. HoMonit builds automata that model the behavior of smart applications and then extracts event signatures from wireless smart home trac. In combination, these methods enable the detection of misbehaving smart applications if the expected behavior deviates from the actual behavior inferred from the network trac. However, this does not prevent event spoong when the attack originates from outside the smart hub, e.g., because of a compromised smart home device. In this case, the event network signature will be present although the triggering event has not occurred.
Event detection with heterogeneous sensors. Recent research has exploited the fact that smart home events have physical effects that can be measured through various sensing modalities. Perceptio [13] builds on the idea of context-based pairing [20, 29] which relies on common sensor measurements to provide the entropy needed to derive symmetric keys. But as devices present in a smart home have diverse sensing modalities, pairing protocols must consider this device heterogenenity in order to be usable. The authors of this paper make the observation that even if devices do not share a common sensor type, they can be aected by the same physical events in dierent ways. For example, when in use, a coee machine has a distinct sound ngerprint that can be picked up by a microphone. If the coee machine is connected to a power meter, that device can detect the power usage of the coee machine. Although those two sensors might measure very dierent patterns and even register the event at dierent times, the timespan between two subsequent events is the same. Perceptio uses this inter-event timing information to construct ngerprints for each event type witnessed by a sensor. These ngerprints are then used to provide the entropy for its pairing protocol.
In a non-security context this observation has been used for activity recognition systems. A recent paper aiming to provide general-purpose sensing in home environments is SyntheticSensors [19] . In this paper, synthetic sensors are introduced as an abstraction to physical events to improve the usability of such a system. The system is based on a single sensor board with nine sensors covering twelve dierent sensing modalities. Individual synthetic sensors are then represented by a base-level Support Vector Machine (SVM), and a global multiclass SVM is trained on the output of all the base-level SVMs. Examples for the 38 synthetic sensors considered in this paper are events that also typically appear in smart home systems, such as "Kettle on", "Door closed" or "Dishwasher running". This paper gives an interesting outlook on how and what kind of events can be detected in a smart home setting.
However, unlike P, it is not designed with an adversary in mind and events have to be labeled explicitly by the user. In contrast, P can verify the veracity of reported smart home events to defend against event spoong attacks and uses smart home event notications to learn event signatures automatically.
SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a system model inspired by contemporary smart home systems as described in Section 2. These systems are controlled by a central hub, and all their trac is routed through that hub.
Besides the hub, P consists of several heterogeneous smart home devices. Devices have attributes that describe what they can do. These attributes can be possible device states or measurements, and supported actions.
In our system, we dierentiate between two dierent attribute types. Attributes related to physical events are considered to be event sources. These attributes consist of a nite list of possible device states or actions. For example, a door sensor has the states "open" and "closed", whereas a window shade understands the actions "up" or "down".
When the state of a device changes in the real world, we refer to it as a physical event. For example, this can be someone turning the door handle and pushing the door to open it, or the window shade moving from one position to another. We dene event notications as reported state changes occurring at time t. An event notication is represented by a tuple E t = (d, a), where d is the aected device and a is the changed attribute of the event source. We assume that events are reported in a timely manner, i.e., the system rejects delayed event notications.
The goal of P is to verify if the physical event associated with a received event notication did in fact occur. Hence, the verication of a physical event is triggered by the reception of an event notication.
Other sensors of various datatypes provide measurements and are used as verication sensors. Data collected by verication sensors gets transmitted to the central hub for further processing. This data is then being used to learn the sensor-specic physicalngerprints of events. Event verication is done by the hub and is based on the aggregate data of all the sensors. We assume that event sources remain uncompromised during training and that the hub system software and verication sensors remain uncompromised during operation. P provides a countermeasure to event spoong, i.e., when an event source or a malicious application running on the hub [11] reports an event that has not physically happened. This should not be confused with event masking, i.e., when no event notication is sent for a real physical event. We leave the exploration of event masking for future work. An overview of P is given in Figure 2 .
THREAT MODEL
We consider an attacker that is able to remotely compromise event sources in the smart home. This allows them to trigger any supported actions or events directly, bypassing the hub. The attacker is, however, not able to make any physical changes to the devices or events. Furthermore, the attacker is able to choose when and if they report an event to the hub. However, events that have a large delay between event timestamp and time of notication will be automatically rejected by the system.
For example, an attacker might want to gain access to a house. Similar to the example in IoTGuard [7] , the back door of the house gets unlocked when the smart home enters a "home mode" which is triggered when the front door opens. The attacker can then use a compromised door sensor to spoof an opening door event to trigger the "home mode" and thus unlock the back door.
However, mismatches between the internal state of a smart home system and reality are not limited to malicious behavior. In our experiments, we have experienced how device faults can have similar eects to attacks. Examples include a window shade not executing commands despite acknowledging them (e.g., due to being stuck) and a smart radiator valve that did not notice that it was constantly heating due to a blocked actuation pin. These kinds of faults are particularly common with "retrotted" smart devices, i.e., regular devices with added smart control logic. The less integrated the smart and normal components of the device are, the more likely is a mismatch between the device's reported and actual state changes. Tables 3 and 4 . Sensor group 8 is mounted on the door, groups 9 and 11 are placed on tables, and group number 4 is xed to a shelf. All the other sensors are mounted on the wall.
Our system considers two types of attackers:
• Zero-eort attacker/Sensor fault • Opportunistic attacker
For both types of attackers, event sensors are considered to be untrusted, as they can be spoofed or exhibit random faults.
The zero-eort attacker spoofs events at arbitrary times and does not have knowledge of any system parameters such as the features used for detection. Furthermore, this attacker can not read the data of the verication sensors.
In comparison, the opportunistic attacker knows all the system parameters such as the features used for detection and has read access to the current data of all sensors. Using this information, this attacker tries to spoof only at times when they think they will be likely to succeed. The attacker's goal is to maximize the probability of their spoofed event going undetected (i.e., being incorrectly judged as genuine) while minimizing the amount of time they have to wait for a spoong opportunity. Neither attacker has physical access to devices and we assume attackers can not modify or suppress data originating from verication sensors.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To evaluate the feasibility of our proposed system, we conduct an experiment in which we collect the physical signatures of 22 event types in a smart oce environment. The experiment is conducted continuously over two weeks while the oce is being used by four people for their everyday work.
Overview
During the study, we collect data for a diverse range of events and sensing modalities. In an oce, we distribute thirteen Raspberry Pis, each equipped with several environmental sensors to collect data. The deployment for this experiment can be found in Figure 3 , while a detailed sensor conguration is listed in Table 3 . A description of the sensor types used in the experiment can be found in Table 2 . We consider as event sources: an oce door with automatic closing (2) mechanism, a sliding window, a ceiling light, an automatic window shade, a fridge, an automated tower fan, a smart radiator valve, a smart coee machine, a PC with attached screen and a smart camera with privacy mode. Over the whole two week duration of the study, we registered 2773 events in our smart environment. A description of the event sources together with their corresponding events and event occurrences can be found in Table 4 .
Data collection
The ground truth for the events is collected as follows. The door, window and fridge are outtted with magnetic contact sensors, shown in Figure 4a . Light switch events are registered through a force-sensitive resistor that registers when the switch is being pressed, see Figure 4b . The smart cam follows a schedule, periodically switching between privacy mode and normal mode every hour. When the smart cam is in privacy mode, its camera is tilted towards its case, preventing it from recording video from the room. Window shade, radiator, fan and coee machine can be controlled via a tablet, see Figure 4c . As the fan used in the experiment does not have any network connectivity, we automate it by using a Raspberry Pi Zero as an infrared remote control, shown in Figure 4b . The doorbell events are being polled from the Ring servers. Events are triggered sporadically by the oce occupants and automatically at certain times. Smart cam, PC and screen events are only triggered automatically, whereas door, window, fridge, doorbell, and coee machine events are only triggered manually. Automatic events follow a schedule with randomized starting times to avoid systematic cross-contamination of event signatures. More details on event schedules are given in Table 5 .
We use the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize time across the Raspberry Pis used in the experiment. The sensors connected to the Raspberry Pis are continuously being polled over their I 2 C interface. The measured data is being saved locally on USB sticks. As an example, the sensor conguration of one Raspberry Pi is shown in Figure 4a . Table 3 : The sensor conguration for the real-world experiment. The sensor modalities covered by each sensor are given in parentheses. The used abbreviations can be found in Table 2 . The deployment is pictured in Figure 3 . (a) The sensor conguration for one of the Raspberry Pis. A detailed listing of the sensor conguration can be found in Table 3 . The contact switch at the top is being used to detect when the window is being opened or closed. (c) The user interface running on an Amazon Fire tablet. It allows users to control the fan, radiator and window shade, as well as make coee.
Figure 4: Experimental setup
In addition to the sensors connected to the Raspberry Pis, we use TP-Link HS110 power meters to measure the voltage, current and power usage of the corded devices. The measurement data of the power meters is continuously polled over WiFi.
Ethical concerns
This project has been reviewed by and received clearance by the responsible research ethics committee at our university. The main concerns relate to the door contact sensors, thermal cameras and the microphones used as sound pressure sensors. The door contact sensors could, in theory, be used to track people's movement (i.e., when they enter or leave the oce). However, as the oce is used by multiple people, it would not be possible to relate this data to individuals. In addition, individuals can enter or leave the room freely if the door is propped open. Naturally, microphone data would be far more sensitive. To avoid this issue, we use the microphones only as sound pressure sensors that record sound levels, rather than the raw audio. As such, it is impossible for sensitive audio data (e.g., conversations) to be recorded. Raw sound pressure values allow the detection of noise, but they do not allow one to accurately determine the event or activity that caused it. Despite their low resolution, the thermal cameras could be used as low-quality video cameras, as the outlines of humans can be easily distinguished from the colder environment. Therefore, we only collect column and row averages of thermal image frames and thus make it impossible to recreate the original video data.
METHODS 6.1 Data labelling
Separately for each event, we label all points in time with either 0 (no event occurred) or 1 (event occurred). The timestamps of 1samples are identied by the corresponding ground truth (e.g., the precise moment a door closes as identied by the contact switch). The event time for automatically triggered events is the moment the command is sent to the device. 0-events are generated periodically in 1-second intervals for the remainder of time. This approach initially leads to "ambiguous" labels close to events. For example, if a door closes at time t, the system will likely detect (and correctly verify) this in a small window around t. The fact that a 0-sample very close to a 1-sample is classied as 1 (i.e., potential spoong opportunity) does arguably not pose a problem. While this would, in theory, allow the attacker to spoof events just before or after actual events, there would be no incentive to do so. In order to deal with this, we use so-called safety margins around events. We remove samples measured during such a safety margin from both the training and test data. We set the size of the safety margin to twice the size of the largest sensor window.
Dataset division
We split our 2-week dataset into three parts: development, training and testing. Each of these parts forms a block of consecutive samples, rather than choosing the appropriate fraction of samples randomly over the entire dataset. This reects actual system operation, for which the training phase has to predate testing in its entirety. This is especially crucial as we require the event sources to remain uncompromised during the training phase. We use therst day of data for development and split the remaining data evenly into training and testing sets.
The development set is used for two purposes: Calculation of the sensor-specic windows and feature selection. We describe the methods for both of these in the following subsections. Based on the selected features, we then train and test the classier on the remaining two parts.
Sensor window selection
Each event is associated with a single timestamp (e.g., the precise moment the contact sensors detects a closing or opening door). However, the physical signature of the event can precede, follow or overlap with the event. An illustration of these dierences is shown in Figure 1 . Even for the same event, the time window in which the event signature is noticeable depends on the sensor. For example, the door closing is preceded by changes in light and followed by an accelerometer response. This event signature window denes the period over which sensor data is collected to verify the event (see the next subsection for details on feature extraction). While it would be possible in principle to manually set these sensor windows for each event based on the data, we develop an automatic approach that is used before the system's training phase:
The window size and position relative to the event is controlled by two parameters: t + and t . Given an event timestamp t, the corresponding window will be the interval (t t , t + t + ). For each event, we obtain the optimal values for both parameters through a grid search on the development set. The performance indicator for this grid search is the average relative mutual information (RMI, see next subsection) of all features. In order to avoid distortion of the average by very poor features, we exclude features that do not perform better than a "random" feature. An illustration of the results of this grid search for the same event and two dierent sensors can be seen in Figure 5 . It is evident that the window for the light sensor largely precedes the event (i.e., negative values of t ) whereas the accelerometer response achieves the best distinctiveness in a 4second window directly following the event.
Feature extraction
The baseline values of many of our environmental sensorsuctuate heavily throughout the day (e.g., the air pressure readings are dependent on the ambient air pressure outside). As we still want to capture transient changes caused by events, we have to compute changes relative to the current baseline. To do so, we compute the features in the following manner. For each 0-sample and each 1sample (see Section 6.1), we construct the event signature window as described in the previous section using parameters t + and t . As the current baseline, we subtract the mean of the preceding window with the same length as the event signature window. We then compute ve statistical features (min, max, mean, sum, and standard deviation) on the corresponding event signature window on the data of every sensor.
Following the feature extraction, we measure each feature's quality (i.e., distinctiveness). This is needed for the computation of ideal window sizes for each sensor (see following subsection) and feature selection. We use relative mutual information (RMI) as a quality measure. RMI is dened as
where H(A) is the entropy of A and H(A|B) denotes the entropy of A conditioned on B. e ent denotes the ground truth for this sample (i.e., 0 or 1) and is therefore discrete. However, the feature space for most features is continuous. In order to precisely determine the conditional entropy, binning would be required to discretise the features. However, the reported RMI would depend on the binning strategy and number of bins (with more bins leading to a higher calculated RMI). To avoid this problem, we use the non-parametric approach proposed by Ross et al. to estimate the mutual information between the discrete event ground truth and continuous features [28] . Due to the small number of 1-samples and the resulting class imbalance, features often show a comparatively high RMI in the development set without actually providing systematic information about the event. This is particularly critical as feature selection is performed on a small subsample of the entire data. Due to timed automated events, events sometimes occur at the same time. While this is not systematic, even a small number of overlaps can lead to overstated RMI. In order to limit the eect of noisy features and reduce model training time, we select features with an RMI above 40%.
Classication and metrics
We use a binary linear support vector machine (SVM) as our classier. We choose a linear kernel due to the large amount of training data (roughly 600,000 samples) and high number of features. The classier is parametrised by the penalty parameter C. Since the two classes (events and non-events) are highly imbalanced, we assign dierent values of C proportional to the fraction of samples for each class. This avoids biasing the classier towards the more common class (i.e., non-events).
Instead of using the actual binary classier decision, we calculate each sample's distance to the decision boundary. This allows us to then dene a threshold on this distance to control the tradeo between detection rate (DR) and false alarm rate (FAR). The DR is dened as the fraction of 0-samples that are correctly classied (i.e., the probability of detecting a spoong attack conducted at a random time). Conversely, the false alarm rate is dened as the fraction of wrongly classied 1-samples (i.e., actual events that are wrongly classied as spoofed). We combine both metrics into the equal error rate (EER), which is the error rate at a threshold where (FAR = 1 DR). Since the relatively limited number of 1-events leads to equally limited number of possible FARs, we use geometric interpolation (see Figure 7 ) to obtain the EER.
Opportunistic attacker
As outlined in our threat model (Section 4), we consider two kinds of attackers: zero-eort attacker and opportunistic attackers. The zeroeort attacker chooses their moment for event spoong randomly without consideration for the physical environment. Conversely, the opportunistic attacker uses information about the verication sensors to spoof at times when they are particularly likely to be successful.
The goal of the opportunistic attacker is to predict whether a given point in time will be misclassied by the verication system (i.e., at what time a spoofed event will be incorrectly classied as genuine). Intuitively, the attacker could copy the verication system since they have access to sensor readings and ground truth. Based on this system, they will learn the system's score for each potential point in time. However, this will only grant them posterior knowledge about opportunities (i.e., they will learn that a good spoong opportunity would have been one second ago). In order to judge whether a time t is suitable for spoong, the attacker can only use information collected up to time t. To reect this limitation, we build an attacker surrogate model as follows:
The attacker rst uses the development dataset to calculate the ideal windows for each sensor. In line with the attacker's limitations, they restrict the t + parameter to non-positive values. Intuitively, this means that only sensor information collected before the "event" is used. They then follow the same methods as the actual system (i.e., feature selection and classier training). Ideally, the scores produced by the surrogate model will be correlated with those of the actual system. The attacker can then continuously classify samples when no events are happening to nd an opportunity (i.e., a sample that scores well on their model). The attacker can then dene a threshold for a spoong attack. This threshold controls the tradeo between success rate (i.e., the probability the system will judge the attacker's spoong as a genuine event) and the waiting time until an opportunity is found.
RESULTS
Feature distinctiveness. Table 6 shows the distinctiveness of feature groups for each event. Each cell shows the maximum RMI within the sensor group. Most results are relatively intuitive: Accelerometers detect door events, window shade events and the use of the coee machine. Power meters primarily detect the devices they are connected to. Light sensors detect both toggling of the light switch and events that lead to obscuring the sensor (e.g., a door opening in the proximity of the sensor). Signal strength (RSS) changes are particularly useful to detect window events. This is a consequence of windows only being operated manually. To do so, the user obscures the line of sight (LOS) between the sensor and the router, which causes predictable RSS changes. RSS changes are not only caused by LOS breaks, but also interference which makes RSS useful to detect the PC's power state changes. Note, that RMI is used to determine the distinctiveness of each individual sensor. Hence, the system is not dependent on a specic sensor conguration or deployment, but is instead able to learn relevant sensors in situ. One of the more surprising results is the high distinctiveness of power meter features for virtually all events. Naturally, this eect is expected for devices that are attached to individual power meters (i.e., fan, fridge, PC, screen, window shade, camera). With the exception of the fridge, the power meters pick up the spike in power once the device is turned on. When the fridge is opened and the temperature rises, the increased cooling leads to a (delayed) increase in power consumption. We observed a voltage spike in all power meters that occurs when the light is turned on or owhich explains the relatively high RMI for these two events. This eect is particularly pronounced when the overall electrical activity is low. These results show that power meters are useful even beyond detecting state changes of their respective devices. Figure 6a shows how dierent sensors contribute to detecting the door closed event. Sound pressure sensors achieve very high RMI that is independent from the sensor's position. Interestingly, the air pressure sensor inside the fridge achieves a similarly high RMI. Our inspection of the raw signal suggests that the door closing actually causes a pressure change inside the fridge and that the reading is not a technical artifact (such as vibration). Figure 6b shows the importance of accelerometers in detecting the door closed event depending on the position of the individual sensor. This importance is not purely down to distance from the door. In fact, sensors on the lock side of the door show higher RMI despite being further away. Unlike sound pressure, the accelerometer signal goes virtually undetected at the other end of the room. Classication results. The classication results are shown in Table 7 . For each event, we list its EER, the detection rate at a threshold that does not cause false alarms and the false alarm rate at 99.9% detection rate. For 9 out of 22 events, we achieve perfect classication (i.e., an EER of 0% or a 100% detection rate at 0% FAR). Some of these events (e.g., door events) draw this good performance from being detected by a multitude of sensors. Others (such as light events) have few, but extremely reliable features. In order to more closely investigate events with less ideal performance (such as window events), we show their ROC curve in Figure 7 . The ROC shows the tradeo between DR and FAR. For most events shown in the curve it is evident that few instances of the event were assigned a very poor classication score. If the threshold is adjusted to (incorrectly) reject them as spoofs, the detection rate almost instantly jumps to 100%. This is most likely due to the event being triggered in a way that is very dierent from the training data (e.g., a person opening a window only an inch). This is a natural consequence of our largely uncontrolled experimental design.
Opportunistic attacker. The goal of the attacker's surrogate model (see Section 6.6) is to accurately predict moments when a spoofed event will be incorrectly veried by the system (we call these moments opportunities). We rst measure the quality of the surrogate model by measuring the correlation between the scores produced by the surrogate model and those of the legitimate model. If this correlation is high, the attacker is more likely to correctly identify opportunities. A visualization of this correlation for the window open event is shown in Figure 8 . It is evident that most opportunities (i.e., samples above the 99% DR cut-o) score relatively highly on the attacker's model. A complete list of correlation coecients (r-values) is given in Table 8 . Door, fridge and window and screen events show a particularly high correlation. For these events, we show in Figure 9 how successful the attacker can be depending on how conservatively they choose his opportunity threshold. For the lowest threshold (corresponding to the highest-scoring 0.5% of samples), the success rate increases from the baseline 1% to over 50% for the fridge closed event. While 0.5% would suggest an opportunity roughly every 200 samples, this is not true in practice because opportunities do not arise randomly, but typically occur in bursts. Table 9 shows an analysis of the median time an attacker has to wait for an opportunity depending on the chosen threshold value. For comparison, the zero-eort attacker achieves an average 1% success rate with no need to wait. Note that both Table 9 and Figure 9 are computed for a xed 99% DR to facilitate comparing events with dierent EERs. This analysis shows that opportunities for most events are extremely dicult to predict in a timely manner since their physical event signatures almost exclusively follow the event itself. As a result, the attacker could only detect the opportunity after it happened, at which point it will be too late to spoof an event. In addition, the attacker can only be successful if there are any opportunities at all. This means that for events with a 100% detection rate, the attacker will always be unsuccessful. Figure 9 : Success rates of the opportunistic attacker for various thresholds. A higher thresholds leads to higher attack success rate but increased wait time for an opportunity.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented P, a system to automatically verify smart home events based on their physical event signatures. We verify 22 events using 48 verication sensors and validate our system on a real-world dataset collected over two weeks. We show that most events are detected by a multitude of sensors, which highlights that P can be used even with few o-theshelf sensors already integrated in smart home devices. 9 out of 22 events achieve a near-perfect EER of 0.00% and 15 events achieve a 0% false alarm rate at a detection rate exceeding 99.9%.
We also formulate the notion of an opportunistic attacker that attempts to predict opportunities (i.e., times when a spoofed event will go undetected) based on verication sensor data. This attacker builds a surrogate event verication model based only on data preceding each sample. We show that some events exhibit signatures that precede or overlap with the event, which makes it possible for the attacker to predict opportunities before they occur. We note that spoong opportunities for the fridge, window and door events are easiest to nd, although their high detection rate still makes an attack very dicult to execute.
We make our entire dataset available online to allow researchers to build on our results.
